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A widely held view in the United States of the US-Saudi Arabian relationship goes 
something like this: For six decades, one of the 
few constants in American foreign policy has been 
the special relationship with Saudi Arabia forged 
by President Roosevelt shortly after the cessation 
of conflict in Europe. Since that time, the United 
States has offered military protection to the Saudi 
royal family in return for the free flow of relatively 
cheap oil. Every president since Franklin Roos-
evelt has stuck by this deal, and the Saudis have 
kept their part of the bargain by building excess oil 
capacity and being a swing producer to moderate 
any oil price spikes. For its part, the United States 
has also championed Saudi causes in international 
organizations such as the World Trade Organiza-
tion. While in the OPEC oil cartel, the Saudis 
have been the voice of moderation.  
All this appeared to change with the onslaught 
of 9/11 – the Saudis, it was felt, had let down the 
US in a time of dire need. With oil prices reaching 
$100 a barrel in late 2007, the Saudis seemed to 
have clearly reneged on their oil deal. Worse yet, 
it was said, the 
jihadists that 
the Saudis un-




ing US soldiers in Iraq. By not standing up to the 
Saudis, the Bush Administration was seen as weak 
or even complicit. 
Perhaps this sentiment prompted President 
Bush to declare in his 2006 State of the Union 
address that the US is dangerously “addicted to 
oil” from unstable countries. Conspiracy theories 
abound. In post-9/11 America there has been a 
flood of books on Saudi Arabia, many of them 
sensational and dire in their predictions. In large 
part, Thicker than Oil is an attempt to dispel many 
of the unfounded perceptions currently in vogue. 
It is a serious book on the US-Saudi relationship 
that avoids both the idealization of Saudi Arabia 
that was once the norm in the US and the now-
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Specifically, Bronson wants her book to be 
read as a sober, balanced counterweight to “recent 
books [that] seem more intent on feeding public 
outrage than on seriously probing” the US-Saudi 
relationship. She lists as offenders such provocative 
recent bestsellers as Robert Baer’s Sleeping with the 
Devil and Craig Unger’s House of Bush, House of 
Saud, which accused Washington of selling its soul 
for crude. Both of these authors often rant about 
the individual greed and shady deals they argue 
shaped US-Saudi relations at the highest levels 
before 9/11.
As the title suggests, the US-Saudi relation-
ship has been much more than just oil for defense. 
Early on, Branson clearly defines the thrust of her 
examination: “Few relationships are as vital, under 
as much pressure, and as poorly understood as that 
between the United States and the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia.” 
The first thing that may surprise readers new 
to the topic is that much of the early US- Saudi re-
lationship was based not so much on oil per se, but 
instead was shaped by the congruence of interests 
between the two countries during the Cold War. 
Saudi Arabia was adamantly anti-communist, and 
successive US administrations built on that fact to 
develop joint projects that wed Saudi financial re-
sources and, at times, religious influence to a series 
of US targeted covert operations. The Saudis were 
generally not eager to draw attention to their role 
in these undertakings, and as a consequence, the 
US public was often not aware of their vital con-
tribution to US security.
The second widely held myth dispelled by 
Branson centers on the widely held view that US-
Saudi relations were never under much stress until 
9/11. Even during the Cold War era, numerous 
frictions existed between the US and Saudi Ara-
bia. There were serious differences over Palestine 
and other inter-Arab issues. Bronson describes 
quite well the mounting frustration felt by the 
Saudis on the eve of the October 1973 war and the 
calculus that let King Faisal impose an oil embargo 
on the United States as a way of pressuring Presi-
dent Richard Nixon and Secretary of State Henry 
Kissinger into playing an active role in the post-
war diplomacy. Kissinger resented what he called 
blackmail, but his resort to shuttle diplomacy was, 
in part, a response to that pressure.
Finally, with the collapse of the Soviet Union 
and disappearance of the international Com-
munist threat, the main rationale underlying the 
US-Saudi relationship ceased to exist. “With the 
end of the Cold War, economic, political and geo-
graphical circumstances have changed so dramati-
cally that neither the US nor the Saudi leadership 
should expect the continuation of the same kind 
of relationship that existed for more than half a 
century” (p. 7). 
Depending on circumstances, the result has 
been a series of ups and downs in the post Cold 
War era. Even the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in Au-
gust 1990, which served as a sharp reminder to 
the Saudis that they were in need of an external 
protector, was clouded by Saudi concern about 
the presence of US troops on their soil and about 
the rise of Islamic radicalism and the inability of 
the United States to deal effectively with Saddam 
Hussein during the 1990s. Bronson notes that the 
Saudis did not have much use for the administra-
tion of Bill Clinton and describes the relationship 
as “in tatters” by 2000 (p.231).
As Bronson ably documents, since 9/11 co-
operation has resumed although not to everyone’s 
liking. The slow Saudi response to American de-
mands for cooperation and information has frus-
trated many in Washington, as has the US involve-
ment in Iraq caused great consternation in Riyadh. 
Many Saudis, as well as Americans, now question 
whether the two countries have enough in com-
mon to maintain an effective working relationship. 
Saudi Arabia’s religious credentials, once seen as 
a strategic asset in the joint effort to defeat “god-
less Communism,” are viewed by a great many 
Americans as having contributed to the danger-
ous growth of radical Islamic movements and to 
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the events of 9/11. The Saudi monarchy, formerly 
considered a force for stability in the Gulf region, 
is now regarded by many US politicians and com-
mentators as under serious threat from radical Is-
lamic dissidents and as an obstacle to US hopes 
to spread democratic values and institutions in the 
Middle East. 
Bronson contends this new emphasis on Sau-
di religious policies ignores the role that Ameri-
can foreign policy played in creating the problems 
that confront the post-9/11 world, in particular 
the encouragement of jihadists to take up the fight 
against the Soviets in Afghanistan. “In many ways 
September 11 was the price we paid for winning 
the Cold War and the strategies we chose. And so 
are our complicated ties with Saudi Arabia” (p. 9). 
While Bronson is optimistic that the US-
Saudi relationship can be resurrected in a man-
ner enabling both countries to counter the many 
forces propelling the region to greater instability, 
she is somewhat vague about the means to bring 
this about. Specifically, she seems to think it is just 
a matter of working out a few kinks in the rela-
tionship. “Today Saudi leaders must work to ad-
dress issues surrounding the financing of extremist 
thought.” In return “Washington must find ways 
to help the pragmatists [in Riyadh] prevail in their 
domestic battle.” (p. 249).
Bronson ends on a fairly hopeful note that 
the two countries are back on track. How suc-
cessful this restoration has been in the two years 
since Thicker than Oil was published is problem-
atic. Writing when the price of oil was about $35 
per barrel, Bronson warns that if prices were to 
increase dramatically, say to $100 per barrel, both 
the international economy and Saudi Arabia’s own 
economic interests would be devastated (p.250). 
With oil having crossed the $100 line, it is not so 
clear that she is right about Saudi self-interest in 
keeping oil prices in a more moderate range.  
However, on the major regional questions she 
seems a better forecaster – the United States and 
Saudi Arabia are in agreement to a greater extent 
than at almost any time in their relationship. They 
both:
1. Worry about increasing Iranian influence 
and the Iranian nuclear program;
2. See the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a 
wound that needs to be healed;
3. Worry about the spill-over effect of Iraqi 
violence; and
4. Vigorously oppose Al-Qaeda and its re-
gional affiliates.
One thing Bronson may not have anticipat-
ed is that the main frictions between the US and 
Saudi Arabia will not be so much over objectives 
as over tactics. And here there is reason to believe 
the relationship will not be nearly as effective in 
countering regional threats as it was the Soviets.
For example, with regard to the Israeli-Pal-
estinian conflict, the Bush administration seeks to 
isolate Hamas diplomatically and choke off the 
economy in Gaza. In contrast Saudi thinking re-
volves in part around the desire to limit Iranian in-
fluence among Palestinians – the Saudi authorities 
see an isolated Hamas turning more toward Tehran 
and wants to use its influence to bring Hamas back 
into an Arab supported, unified  Palestinian front. 
Similar differences between the two countries exist 
for the other objectives noted above.
As Bronson documents throughout her study, 
such tensions are a normal feature of the Saudi-US 
relationship and, therefore, do not herald a crisis in 
the making. Still, how these tensions will play out is 
hard to assess. Despite Bronson’s objectivity, Thicker 
Than Oil is written from largely an American per-
spective and this is its main weakness.  It will be the 
minor shifts in Saudi tactics that largely determine 
the effectiveness of the relationship in attaining the 
goals noted above – and these may be so subtle as 
to be beyond the grasp of US policymakers even 
after reading Bronson’s valuable contribution. 
